Additive representation theory on subsets of Cartesian products has characteristics different from additive representation theory on full Cartesian products. This paper describes the difficulties that can arise on subsets. These difficulties have been underestimated in the literature.
Introduction
This paper studies additive representation theory on subsets of Cartesian products. Interest in this topic has increased during the last decade because of new developments in decision making under risk and uncertainty, and because of new developments in the measurement of inequality. This paper considers the topological approach, i.e., it makes use of continuity assumptions. Wakker (1991) has given results for the algebraic approach, where solvability and an Archimedean axiom are used instead of continuity. The present paper builds on the latter one. A comparison of the algebraic and the topological approach has been given in Wakker (1988) , and in Lute et al. (1990, see p. 49, 1. 10) .
Traditional expected utility theory was characterized mainly by 'independence' axioms. Dissatisfaction with expected utility has led to weakenings of independence that require independence to hold only within certain subdomains. Special cases of this general procedure for weakening independence include Chew (1989) , who requires independence to hold only within equivalence classes, and the 'twins' Jaffray (1988) and Gilboa (1988) , who require independence to hold only, among others, when minimal outcomes are identical. In Becker and Sarin's (1987) 'lottery-dependent expected utility' the sets of lotteries within which independence should hold are characterized by having the same (lottery-dependent) utility function. The present paper has been motivated by the rank-dependent theories initiated by Quiggin (1982) and Schmeidler (1989 Schmeidler ( , first version 1982 , which require independence to hold only on 'comonotonic' subsets. The literature and history of rank-dependent theories have been discussed in Wakker (1991) . After completion of that paper we found Birnbaum (1974, p. 559) and Birnbaum and Sutton (1990) . These papers deal with 'configural weight theory', which is similar to rank-dependent utility in that decision weights are also allowed to depend on ranking.
Section 2.3 discusses several papers dealing with additive representations on subsets of Cartesian products. In addition let us mention here that the case of additive functions, linear with respect to a mixture operation, has been dealt with by Fishburn (1976) . The present paper will not assume linearity with respect to mixing. Necessary and sufficient conditions for general additive representability on arbitrary countable subsets of Cartesian products were provided by Jaffray (1974b) for two dimensions, and Jaffray (1974a) for arbitrary finite dimensions. We study the special case of additive representations that are continuous with respect to a connected topology. Euclidean spaces are, of course, the most important example of this type. In two dimensions, Blaschke and Bol (1938, Chapter 1) derived this representation for open, simply connected domains in which all equivalence classes and all intersections of the domain with hyperplanes perpendicular to an axis are connected. Recently Segal (1990) showed how to extend these results to finite dimensions greater/equal three, and to open domains within Euclidean spaces that are connected instead of simply connected.
It has occasionally been thought that additive representation theory on subsets of Cartesian products does not differ from additive representation theory on full Cartesian products, when the subsets have interiors that are 'full-dimensional' and connected. A first counter-example, refuting several conjectures in the literature, was given in Wakker (1989b, Remark 111.7.8) . It is illustrated and modified in fig. 2 below. Indeed, Krantz et al. (1971, p. 276 , lines 6/7) had already suggested that the subject is nontrivial. We shall observe the following phenomenona, typical for subsets of Cartesian products in the topological approach:
(1) [See Example 3.8.1 One reason that the traditional axioms no longer imply additive representability is that, loosely speaking, an additive representation may be 'driven to infinity' at maximal alternatives, and to minus infinity at minimal alternatives.
(2) [See Examples 3.9 and 3.10.1 Continuity of > on a subset X of the Cartesian product V no longer has to imply continuity of the associated binary relation 3' on %?. We shall show that on rank-ordered subsets of Cartesian products additive representation theory essentially remains valid, as long as maximal and minimal alternatives are excluded. Loosely speaking, rank-ordered subsets provide sufficient overlap between different local additive representations to make these tit together into one global additive representation. The results of this paper will be used in Chew and Wakker (1991) to characterize the preference relations on full Cartesian products that satisfy 'comonotonic independence'. Comonotonic independence requires that the usual additive representation axioms hold only within rank-ordered subsets.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss some common errors that have caused many misunderstandings in the literature, and might be feared to continue doing so. Section 2.1 describes them without yet criticizing, giving the reader the opportunity to find the mistakes by him-or herself. Section 2.2 points out the mistakes, and section 2.3 discusses the literature. Section 3 gives the main results of this paper. It can be read independently of the other sections. Section 3.5 gives examples that show peculiarities of extreme alternatives in rank-ordered subsets. Proofs are given in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Common misconceptions
This section discusses some erroneous reasonings. Their alleged correctness has been accepted in the literature as a kind of common knowledge. To prevent future misunderstandings we have decided to present these reasonings in detail, see section 2.1. The reader is invited to find the mistakes by him-or herself, prior to reading section 2.2 where they are exposed.
Common beliefs
For simplicity we assume in this subsection that the domain of the preference relation is (a subset of) [w", and that the preference relation is a continuous and increasing weak order. For consistency of terminology, elements of Iw" are called alternatives.
Claim 2.1 [From local to global additive representation].
If for every alternative in L%" there is a neighborhood on which there is an additive representation for the preference relation (local additive representability) then there exists a ('global') additive representation.
Alleged Proof. Let us repeat that by the well-known uniqueness results additive representations are unique up to scale and location. The neighborhoods may and will be assumed to be open rectangles. We use as-if twodimensional terminology.
Step 1. Take any starting alternative. Take the open rectangle around the starting alternative, and the additive representation on this rectangle.
Step 2. Next take any second rectangle that intersects the first, for example one around a boundary point of the first. Take the additive representation on the second rectangle. On the intersection of the first and second rectangle (that intersection is itself a rectangle) the two additive representations represent the same preference relation. Hence by standard uniqueness results we can change scale and location of the additive representation on the second rectangle so that it coincides with the additive representation of the first rectangle on common domain; so we do. We have obtained an additive representation on the union of two rectangles.
Step k. Suppose k-1 rectangles have been covered. Take any rectangle that has not yet been covered and that intersects the area already covered, and the additive function Vk on that new rectangle. On the intersection with the area already covered it represents the same preference relation as the additive function I/ constructed so far. Hence by standard uniqueness results we can choose scale and location so that Vk coincides with I/ on common domain.
By the lemma of Zorn, or countable induction and topological separability, this process will stop only if the entire domain R" has been covered. A global additive representation has been obtained. 
Flaws in the alleged proofs
Flaws in the Alleged Proof of Claim 2.1. We distinguish four flaws in the Alleged Proof of Claim 2.1, of which the fourth flaw is generated by the lirst three.
The first flaw occurs at Step 2. There we have constructed an additive function on a union of two rectangles, that is representing on each of the rectangles. After a little reflection the reader will see that this does not mean that the additive function is representing on the union of the two rectangles. In general, if a function on a union of two sets is representing on each of the two sets, it need not be representing on the union. The additive function may compare incorrectly an element from the first rectangle that is not contained in the second, with an element from the second rectangle that is not contained in the first. See fig. 2 , where W is representing both on the rectangle E, u E,, and on the rectangle E, u E,, but not on their union.
The second flaw does not occur at the first or second step, but only at later steps. Suppose we have constructed an additive representation on the first k-1 rectangles, and want to include the kth rectangle, intersecting the area already covered. On the intersection the two additive functions represent the same preference relation. This does not ensure that they therefore differ only by scale and location. That has been established in the literature only for the special case where the intersection is a connected Cartesian product, and can readily be extended to any connected set. The intersection is not necessarily a connected set though. As a general example, think of the case where the intersection consists of two disjoint parts A and B that share no coordinates; suppose all elements of A are strictly preferred to those of B. An additive representation is given on the union of the two, it is positive on A, and negative on B. Then we can multiply the function by two on A and leave it unchanged on B, to obtain an alternative additive representation on the union. It has not been obtained from the original one in the usual way. The third flaw also does not occur at the first or second step, but only at later steps. Suppose again we have constructed an additive representation on the first k-1 rectangles, and want to include the kth rectangle, intersecting the area already covered. Suppose we can escape from the second flaw and can 'tit together' the representations, i.e., obtain one function on the union of these k rectangles that is additive and representing on the union of the first k-1 rectangles, and on the kth rectangle. In the first flaw above we already saw that this one function may not be representing on the union of the k rectangles; in addition, the function may neither be additive. In general, a function that is additive on each of two sets need not be additive on their union. See fig. 1 .
There is a fourth flaw, generated by the first and third. To wit, let us look at the kth step. It was claimed that the additive representation on the kth rectangle would on the intersection with the area already covered represent the same preference relation as the additive representation already constructed. This is not necessarily true because of the first and third flaws. In the decision literature a version of Claim 2.2 is found in Quiggin (1989, Proposition 4) . See also Kahneman and Tversky (1979, Appendix;  since the probabilities sum to 1, the domain there is not a full Cartesian product). Other derivations, while basically correct, have dealt with the problems described above in very concise and implicit manners. Let us, given its importance, discuss in detail Debreu (1960, Theorem 3). Below fig. 1 ('Actually, . . . type') of that paper, Claim 2.1 is made for dimension 2. Debreu (1990) referred to Blaschke and Bol (1938) , where it is indeed found in Exercise 8 of Section 1.2, p. 22, be it with little elaboration.
This result is essentially used in Debreu (1960, proof of Theorem 3), when for global additive representability on the two-dimensional sets denoted Ti x T2 only local ('in the small') additive representability, on neighborhoods denoted U, has been established. Again, for extension of the additive representation from sets TI x ... x Tk_, to sets T, x ... x Tk there, only local additive representability has been established, on neighborhoods denoted I/: Because the dimensions 1, . . . , k-1 can be taken together, this can be reformulated as a two-dimensional problem, and can (first within each compact subset) be derived from the result in Blaschke and Bol (1938) . So again it can be justified; sometimes Debreu has been criticized for these two steps. Note however that the domain (i.e., the domain of the function denoted gk) there is not necessarily a full Cartesian product; this can be seen to be no serious problem, by the reformulation as mentioned above and Blaschke and Bol
k:
Indifference surface through t-3,6,6) and (IS,-3,-3). Also border between X-and X++.
: Indifference surface through (-1,8,8 ) and (16,-2,-Z). The function V is defined as WJ2 on E, nX++, as W on the remainder of X. The binary relation + is represented by V Note that W represents $ not only on E, v Ez, but also on E, v E,. Still W does not represent 3 on the entire X; it compares incorrectly pairs of elements x, y with XEX++ n E, and ycX++ n E,. To wit:
-2, -2). For every element of X there exists a neighborhood on which the preference relation has an additive representation, and on which V is a strictly increasing transform of that additive representation:
W can always be taken for that additive representation, and X-or E, or E, for the neighborhood.
Still, the representing function V is not a transform of any additive function. For suppose it were; contradiction will follow. The additive function would be of the form 40 W on E, u E,, and of the form 4'0 W on E, v ES, for positive afline 4,+'. From E, we infer that 4=@. However, then V would be a strictly increasing transform of W on X. This is impossible because W is not representing on the entire X. The preference relation satisfies all usual conditions for additive representability, only the domain is not a full Cartesian product. To wit, + is transitive, complete, and continuous. Its domain X is topologically connected (even simply connected). Also + satisfies CL This follows mainly from the fact that the two separate parts of X+' have no coordinates in common, This also shows that the meaning of CI [and, more generally, (1988, for n = 2) and Nakamura (1990) for Choquet expected utility, i.e., expected utility on rank-ordered sets.
[Lemma 2 in Nakamura (1990), is subject to the 'driven to infinity problem, but this is no serious problem.] To the best of our knowledge, all these authors obtained the first versions of their results independently.
They avoided the flaws indicated above by employing, in an early stage of the proof, the proportionality of the additive value functions that is available in their set-ups.
The correctness of Claim 2.1 has been an open problem for me ever since my first reading of the claim in Debreu (1960, below fig. 1 ). This, together with the recent developments in decision theory, has triggered my investigation. Only when Debreu (1990) pointed out that his referring to Blaschke and Bol (1938) also covered this claim, and when I understood from Fishburn (1970, fig. 5 .7 and p. 74, Step 5) that it sufficed to prove the result on compact sets, did I find a proof, in Wakker (1990) . Obviously, this proof is more involved than the alleged proof as sketched above.
3. The main results 3.1. Rank-ordered alternatives; extreme alternatives; the set X %? is a nonempty connected topological space, with elements called outcomes. +=' is a weak order on %?, i.e., it is complete (Vu, fi E VT:: CI 3' /? or fi 3'~) and transitive. >', <', <', N' are as usual. We assume that nz2. An n-tuple (xi,..., x,) E %" is rank-ordered if xi 3' x2 3'. . +=' x,, and is then called a rank-ordered alternative. The set of rank-ordered alternatives is denoted as %r. Since non-rank-ordered alternatives will not be considered in this paper, we simply say alternative instead of rank-ordered alternative. The restriction to rank-ordered alternatives implies, in the terminology introduced by Schmeidler (1989) that all alternatives are 'comonotonic'. Thus 'coordinate independence' in our set-up will be identical to 'comonotonic coordinate independence'. An outcome c( is maximal if p >'c( for no outcome /?, u is minimal if B <' CI for no outcome b. Note that a rank-ordered alternative with maximal nth coordinate must have all of its coordinates maximal, and a rank-ordered alternative with minimal first coordinate must have all of its coordinates minimal.
We call such alternatives extreme. We shall see in this paper, primarily in section 3.5, that complications and new phenomena can occur for extreme alternatives when the domain of the preference relation is not a full Cartesian product. We consider a binary (preference) relation 3 on a set Xc%':. Either X will be the set of all (rank-ordered) alternatives, or it will be that set with the extreme alternatives excluded. Again >, 4, <, -are as usual. Often a 'constant' alternative (a,. . . , a) EX will be identified with the outcome ME%?. Transitivity and the monotonicity assumption of this paper will ensure that >' and + are in agreement, i.e., for all (c(, . . . ,a), (b,. . . $)EX:
(a,..., 4 % (P, . . * 9 B)=-a 2='B.
Intuitive conditions of additive representations
Throughout, suppose E c X. Because we consider varying subsets of V", it is useful to deline the properties introduced below for subsets of Cartesian products. Whenever below E =X (X the entire domain of +), we omit the phrase 'on E'. 3 is a weak order on E if it is transitive on E (Vx, y, ZE E:
and complete on E (VX,~EE: x$y or y+x). A function V represents + on E if E is contained in the domain of r/; V's range is R, and x 3 yo V(x) 2 V(y). A function V is additive on E if Vx E E: V(x) =I;= 1 q(xj) for some functions V,, . . . , V, to 5%. If an additive function represents 2, then the Vi's are additive value functions. We sometimes say that an additive representing function is 'the sum' of the additive value functions. Given different domains this is a slight abuse of terminology. A function I' is cardinal (or an 'interval scale') if, loosely speaking, it 'can be replaced' by any function r+oV for real z and positive 0. Additive value functions (I$=i are jointly cardinal if they can be replaced by (~j);_l if and only if there exist real zi, . . . , T,, and a positive g, such that tf j: Wj = zj + aVj.
If in the above definitions the range of I/ (and the Q's) is R u {-cc, co} instead of R, then I/ is called an extended representation, respectively extended additive representation, and the Vys are called extended additive ualue functions. Obviously an (additive) representation is an extended additive representation, and additive value functions are extended additive value functions. R u (-cc, a} is endowed with the usual addition and multiplication rules, with cc -cc undefined. We write X_~CI for x with xi replaced by c(, and, for i # j, x -i,,qp for x with xi replaced by c(, xi replaced by fi. If extended additive value functions exist on EcX then 3 is coordinate independent (Cl) on E, i.e., X _ ia > y _ in 0 x _i/? $ y _ i/I whenever all alternatives in question are contained in E. As shown in Wakker (1991), on rank-ordered sets CI implies that preferences are independent not only of one common coordinate, but of any set of common coordinates. If extended additive value functions exist for 3 on E cV" then + satisfies generalized triple cancellation on E c %'", i.e., for all x _ :c(, . . . , w _ i 6 E E: Note that, for reflexive >, this implies CI, by setting LY=/$ y =6, x= y. The binary relation > satisfies monotonicity on E if a >'/3~ ~_~a > X_iB for all X_~CI, X_$E E. Analogously a function I' to R satisfies monotonicity on E if E is in the domain of V and a+'Bo
for all x-p, X-ipEE.
Also we call, for Ejc %?, a function 5: E,-+R monotonic on Ej if Ej is in the domain of 5 and VC@E Ei a >' fro Pi 2 5(:(B).
Technical conditions of additive representations
In this section we give some technical conditions. They can be skipped by readers not interested in details. Most of these conditions are only used in proofs; the definition of the second-order Archimedean axiom is used only in Theorem 3.3(c) and its proof.
Coordinate i is inessential on E (with respect to >) if Vx,x_p E E: x wx_p.
The opposite of inessential is essential. Next we define the Archimedean axiom. As a preparation we define a standard sequence; a standard sequence may be infinite or finite of any length. For coordinate j we call al,c?,. . . a standard sequence (on coordinate j) with respect to 3 on E cV, if there exist x, i# j, vi+ W,E% such that, for all k= 1,2,. . . , we have X_i,jVi, akE E, x_~,~w~,M~+' E E, and
A sequence cl', Ed,. . . on coordinate j is bounded on E if there exist clsup and czinf such that Pp 3' LX~ 3'~~"~ for all k, with xj=ainf, yj=c('"P for some x,y~ E (the latter to ensure that asup, xinf are in the range of additive value functions, if these exist). The Archimedean axiom requires that every bounded standard sequence is finite. On rank-ordered sets a stronger notion of the Archimedean axiom will be needed. For coordinate j we call ,i, c?,. . . a second-order standard sequence (on coordinate j) with respect to E c%"', if for every k there exists a standard sequence p', p2,. . . on coordinate j with respect to 3 on E, such that, for some m, m', /EN, ak -'pm, ak+l -'/?"+l, and ak+2 -'pm+2r. The second-order Archimedean axiom requires that every bounded second-order standard sequence is finite. Since any standard sequence is a second-order standard sequence, the second-order Archimedean axiom implies the usual one. Again it is necessary for additive representa-bility: the q-differences of subsequent outcomes in a second-order standard sequence are constant. The condition is somewhat less unattractive and, by itself, less restrictive than the strong Archimedean axiom as needed in the algebraic approach in Wakker (1991) .
A comprehensive presentation of elementary topological definitions, and further definitions, is given in Wakker (1989b, Section 0.1). Readers not familiar with general topology may simply assume that %= [w, and that preferences are increasing (a > fl -X_~CI > x _&I); then all topological assumptions below are satisfied. Without further mention we assume throughout that X, as well as any E c X, are endowed with the restriction of the product topology on V. We call 3 continuous on E if for all ye E the sets {XG E: x + y} and {x E E: x =$ y} are closed. Analogously, 3' on %? is continuous if for all ME%? the sets {fly%: b +'a} and {PE'%': j3 a'~} are closed. In general, continuity of $, or continuity of additive value functions, does not imply continuity of >' on %?. Continuity of &' is, however, needed in the main results, hence will be presupposed in the Structural Assumption 3.1.
The main theorems
This subsection gives the main theorems. These adapt the results of Wakker (1991) to the topological approach. For the sake of easy reference and self-containedness we shall spell out several straighforward corollaries. Let us repeat the assumptions of our set-up:
%? is a nonempty connected topological space, nz2, and subsets of %?" are endowed with the restriction of the product topology. + is a binary relation on a set Xc%?; of rank-ordered alternatives. Rank-ordering is with respect to a continuous weak order $' on %? 'agreeing' with the binary relation > on X restricted to constant alternatives.
The assumption of continuity of 3' can often be deleted, for instance for n 2 3 in Theorem 3.2. See Proposition 3.11. In the topological approach it is -more convenient to formulate conditions for additive value functions, than for their sum (the additive representation) as was done in Wakker (1991). Concerning the uniqueness result at extreme alternatives, we shall see at the end of section 4.2 that V, must assign the value co to maximal outcomes if that is the supremum of the values of V, over nonmaximal outcomes. If that supremum is not co, V, can either be taken to be that supremum, or co. Similarly, to minimal outcomes, V, either assigns the intimum over the nonminimal outcomes, or -co. The following theorem shows when the representation in Statement (i) above can be taken finite.
Theorem 3.3. We may add in Statement (i) of Theorem 3.2 that the additive value functions are everywhere finite (thus co@nuous) if we either: (a) add in the theorem the assumption that there are no maximal or minimal outcomes, or (b) restrict the domain X of + to %F\{extreme alternatives}, instead of %?F, or (c) add in Statement (ii) the second-order Archimedean axiom.

Each of these changes gives again equivalent Statements (i) and (ii).
Note that Theorem 3.3.(c) has given a characterization of additive representability on rank-ordered subsets in full generality. It shows that the lemma in the appendix of Green and Jullien (1988) can be corrected by addition of the second-order Archimedean axiom. The condition in the proposition below does not give a representation result in the strict sense because it is not directly in terms of the observable primitive, the preference relation.
Proposition 3.4. The additive value functions in Theorem 3.2(i) can be taken finite if and only if V, is bounded below on the nonminimal outcomes whenever a minimal outcome exists, and V, is bounded above on the nonmaximal outcomes whenever a maximal outcome exists.
Again, the proportionality condition below is not directly in terms of the preference relation. Wakker (1991, above Corollary 6) lists several conditions from the literature that characterize proportionality directly in terms of the preference relation. The following corollary repeats some special cases. If one sets X =([w+): in the above corollary then, strictly speaking, it may happen that no additive value functions exist, because the additive value function I', may be 'driven to -00' at 0. Note that the monotonicity conditions in the above results have ruled out inessential coordinates. Inessential coordinates can be suppressed from notation, thus do not complicate the above results. Definitions of the conditions in the Remark below are given in Wakker (1989b), as well as in many other references, 
Extreme alternatives and continuity
Example 25a in the algebraic approach of Wakker (1991) showed that an additive value function V, at maximal outcomes, if finite, can take any value greater/equal the supremum over the nonmaximal outcomes. That was because no continuity was imposed. If continuity is imposed, such as in this paper, then the additive value function, if finite, simply has to be the mentioned supremum at maximal outcomes. Similar things apply to V, and minimal outcomes. Let us now present two examples showing that, even on 'nice' subsets of Cartesian products, continuity of >' is problematic. In some cases it is not implied by the other conditions in the main theorems. Case la. U=]O, 11, endowed with the restriction of the circle topology; 3 is defined on Cf\{(l, 1)). It is continuous because the topology on %",2\{(1,1)} coincides with the usual Euclidean topology. This case also illustrates that on a subset of a Cartesian product an additive representation [(x,,xJc~x, fx,] can be continuous whereas not all of the additive value functions are continuous: X,HX, is not continuous as a function from 10, ll-with-the-circletopology to R-with-the-usual-Euclidean-topology. no maximal or minimal outcomes maximal and/or minimal outcomes Fig. 5 . + means that continuity of >' is implied by the other conditions, -means it is not. This depends on the domain X of 3, the presence or absence of maximal/minimal outcomes, the dimension n, and whether Statement (i) or Statement (ii) in Theorem 3.2 is assumed to hold. function-value cc or -00 implies convergence of function-values to co or -co, respectively. Then joint cardinality would have resulted on the entire domain in all results, and Example 3.10 would have been ruled out. We do not pursue this line.
Proofs
No extreme alternatives: Proof of Theorem 3.3.(b), thus of Theorem
3.3.(a)
We assume throughout this subsection that Assumption 3.1 holds, and that X =V~\(extreme alternatives}. First suppose (i) in Theorem 3.2 holds. Note that, by the definition of additive value functions, VI only has to be defined on the nonminimal outcomes, V,, only on the nonmaximal outcomes. Continuity of each F implies continuity of each V/I:(x,,. . .,x,)H v(x,) (also for i= 1 and i=n), thus of the sum of these functions. This implies continuity of 3. The other conditions of (ii) are straightforward.
Next we assume (ii) holds (with generalized triple cancellation weakened to CI for n>=3), and derive (i). We derive this as a corollary from Theorem 4.(b) in Wakker (1991) . There the following two conditions were used instead of continuity to derive additive representability; the two conditions will now be derived from continuity. Finally we shall then establish continuity of the additive value functions, and the uniqueness result. 3 satisfies restricted solvability on E if, for all x-p, y, x_,y E E:
If >' is trivial (has one equivalence class) then, all alternatives being both maximal and minimal, X is empty, so Statement (i) is vacuous. So we suppose henceforth that 3' has at least two equivalence classes. open for all j, all elements of which are strictly preferred to y. Obviously, not y E Hi because x-;y is in X but is strictly dispreferred to y. There may however be outcomes t <' y in Hi, simply because xPir $ X, i.e., r <'xi+ r. We exclude such z by considering, instead of Hi, H: = Hi n {z E ST?: z >' y}, which by continuity of 3' is open, and contains 0. So we may, and do, assume that H c {ze%? T >'r>. To see that Hc E+, note that for each r E H either r +'cr or r <'cc in which case indeed c( >'r >'y and x_,z~(H, x ... x H,) n X, so X_~T > y.
Analogously, the set E-:={a~%': a=$'y or (a>'o>'y and x_~o<Y)) is open. Both E+ and E-are nonempty, and they are disjoint. By connectedness of %Y', there must be a /3 contained neither in E+ nor in E-. Because c( >_'/I >'y, we have x_#EX;
x-$-y follows. If x_i,jwi,pl#X then j>l and pl>'xj_i +'ak (with x~_~:=w~ if i=j-1) for all k, the latter preference because ~_~,~w~,a~ is rank-ordered for all k. Then p" = Xj_ 1 can be taken. A similar reasoning applies if x _ i,jui,pl 4 X. So suppose x _ i,jWi,~' E X and X-i,jUi,~' E X. By monotonicity, for all k,
3 X_i,jW,ak+2 > x_i,jwi,ak+l Iv X -i , jVi,Ork.
By restricted solvability, there exists a p" between p1 and a1 (or any other ak) such that X _ i,jUe~"O N X _ i,jW, p'. We saw above that, for each k, the latter is strictly preferred to x _ i,jUgak, SO X_ i,jUecL" > x _ i,jU,ak. By monotonicity ,D' >' ak for all k, and ,u' is as desired.
Case (b). oi <' wi. This is analogous to the above case. Now ak+ ' <' ak for all k, and one defines E+ : = {BE%? 3k$>'ak}, (1991) . For the application of the latter result note that, because >' is continuous with respect to a connected topology, as soon as it has two or more equivalence classes, it must have infinitely many equivalence classes.
Extreme alternative: Proof of Theorem 3.2
As a preparation we show that the requirement of continuity of the preference relation at extreme outcomes is immaterial. Proof. We derive openness of the set P'(y):= {xEW;: x > y}. If y is maximal then P'(y) is empty, thus open. So assume y is not maximal. P'(y)\{maximal alternatives} = :P(y) = {x E %Y:\{extreme alternatives}: x > y} is an open subset of 'e:\{extreme alternatives}. So there exists an open set PC%?" intersecting C:\{extreme alternatives) in exactly that subset. By monotonicity we may assume that Pc(uj", 1 {xE'%? Xj nonminimal}) , by intersecting with that latter open set. I.e., we may assume that P does not contain minimal alternatives. If no maximal outcomes exist then P'(y) = P n 55'; and we are done. So suppose there exist maximal outcomes. We show that P may be assumed to contain maximal alternatives.
To that end we first find an alternative j~P '(y) with all coordinates nonmaximal. Because y is nonmaximal, there is a coordinate is n such that y,, . . . , yip 1 are maximal and yi is nonmaximal. Say i 2 2, otherwise j = y can be taken. By continuity of +' and connectedness of %? there exists a nonmaximal ji >' yi. By monotonicity, the nonmaximal y-iii E P(y). There must exist open A,, . . . , A, such that y_i~iEA, x ... xA,cP.
We may, and do, replace Ai_ 1 by the open nonempty Ai-1 n {y: y > pi). By closedness of {maximal outcomes} ~97, and connectedness of %', Aipl contains a nonmaximal outcome ji _ i. Then y-,,(i-l)Fi, ji-, E P(y): we have replaced the maximal yi_l by a nonmaximal pi_ 1 without leaving P(y). Continuing that way we end up with FE P(y) that has all coordinates nonmaximal.
The set r)l= 1 {u E Vi"': ui >'ji} is open. All of its elements being strictly preferred to j, its intersection with %?T is a subset of P(y), and we may replace P by its union with fly= 1 {uE%'": vi >' ji}. This contains all maximal alternatives; openness of P'(y) follows. Analogously, {x E%??:: x i y} is open. 0
We next derive the implication (i)=$ii) in Theorem 3.2. Transitivity, completeness, and monotonicity are direct. Generalized triple cancellation, hence CI, follows straightforwardly, either by elimination of cases, or by substitution of the extended additive representation.
Next we turn to continuity. If we restrict both the additive function and the preference relation to the nonextreme alternatives, then these restrictions are all continuous, as well as the associated additive value functions. Now continuity of 3 follows from Lemma 4.3. It is a remarkable property of rankordered sets that continuity of the additive value functions on the nonextreme alternatives implies continuity of 3 on all alternatives.
For (ii)*(i), suppose >' contains at least two, so infinitely many, equivalence classes, to avoid triviality. Theorem 3.3.(b) gives an additive representation V on %:\{extreme alternatives}. We can assign to maximal extreme alternatives any V-value greater/equal the supremum over the other alternatives, by letting I',', assign to the maximal outcome any value greater/equal sup( V,( { nonmaximal outcomes})). Note that that supremum is not assigned to any nonmaximal outcome, 3' being continuous with respect to a connected topology. The supremum may be co. For continuity of V" where it is finite, the only finite value that V, can assign to a maximal outcome is the mentioned supremum. The case of minimal extreme alternatives is similar, let V, (minimal outcome) = inf ( y { nonminimal outcomes})) or -Co. Below the definition of the second-order Archimedean axiom it was already pointed out that the condition is necessary for real-valued additive representability. So let us assume that it holds, together with Statement (i), thus (ii), of Theorem 3.2. Suppose that there exists a maximal outcome with K-value 'driven to co', i.e., sup(l/,(%\{ maximal outcomes}) = co. The case of Vi driven to -co is similar. Violation of the second-order Archimedean axiom will be derived. We construct an infinite increasing second-order standard sequence (ak)k"_ i, obviously bounded above by the maximal outcomes, and bounded below by cl'. Take any (~l~)km,i with v,(ak+')-Vn(ak)= 1 for all k. V,(%'\( maximal outcomes)) being connected, this is possible. Fix k. Because K-l((aE% cxk+2 <'cc <'a"'})
is a nondegenerate interval, we can find xk+' <'y <'6 $'a k+3 and IEN such that V,_,(6)--l/,_,(y)=l/.
Next we take a sequence (fi"')~'=,, such that /?' = ak, j' =gk+i, p" = OI~+~, and I/n(~m+l)-v;t(/?m)=l/I for all 05rn521-1.
Then, with zi='.. =zn-2:=ak+3 to ensure rank-orderedness of the following alternatives, z_(, _ lj,ny,gm+ ' N z_~,,_~~,~B,/?~ for all Osms221--1. In other words, (/I")~~o is a standard sequence on coordinate n. As this can be obtained for each k, (ak)FZ1 is an infinite bounded second-order standard sequence. A violation of the secondorder Archimedean axiom has been obtained. Proposition 3.4 follows immediately from section 4.2, or from Proposition 5 in Wakker (1991); restricted solvability, as required in the latter, is implied by Lemma 4.1. Proposition 3.5 is a corollary of Proposition 3.4, or of Corollary 6 in Wakker (1991) and again Lemma 4.1. Corollary 3.6 is a special case of Theorem 3.3.(a). Remark 3.7 is analogous to Remark 23 in Wakker (1991) . Note that in the topological approach, contrary to the algebraic approach, also the hexagon condition can be used to obtain additive representability for two dimensions; see for instance Wakker (1989b, Theorem 111.6.6(ii) ).
In Proposition 3.11, Statement (a) follows from continuity of Vi (representing 3' by monotonicity) on %?, and Statement (b), proved next.
Under the conditions of (b) we derive openness of {BE%? p >'x>. The additive representation of preferences on subsets of Cartesian products is more complicated than has usually been thought. Several incorrect ideas have been accepted almost as common knowledge. To prevent future misunderstandings we have described and criticized them. Further we have given positive results for the special and simple, but presently most important, case: the rank-ordered cone. Still the proofs were not simple. Maximal and minimal alternatives cause complications. The obtained result will make possible the derivation of further results for rank-dependent approaches to decision making under risk and uncertainty, and the derivation of further results for generalizations of the Gini index for welfare theory. Proof: Suppose some 5 is not continuous. Then it certainly is not continuous with respect to the order topology induced by 3'. Contradiction will follow. The domain of Vj is connected with respect to the order topology, also for j= 1 and j = n. For j= 1 and j = n this follows by standard techniques, see for instance Wakker (1989b, Lemma VI.7.4) By restricted solvability, as implied by Lemma 4.1, there exists b, between Xj+l and v" such that ~_j, (j+l,bj,xj+,~~_j,(j+l)VI,~j+l. This would however imply v> y{b,) >p, in contradiction with the assumed gap. So (A.l) holds.
The assumption of the gap implies that there are at least countably many equivalence classes of outcomes with I/,-value below ~1, so certainly below v". Actually, as soon as there exist two, then by standard reasonings there are uncountably many; see for instance Wakker (1989b, Lemma VI.7.4 and p. 42, lines 3/4) . By (A.l) that would generate uncountably many mutually disjoint open intervals with length v-p and midpoints vj+ I(aj+ J for uj+ 1 5';. This is impossible by denseness of the rationals in the reals. Contradiction has resulted.
Case 2. j= n. Now v" cannot be maximal, because maximal outcomes are not contained in the domain of V,. Analogously to Case 1 above, we can show that O<~j-,(xj-I)-~j_,(yj_,)<v-~ for no xj_i, yj-I from q'(]v, co[). Again, there are uncountably many equivalence classes in 5 '(Iv, co[). This would induce uncountably many mutually disjoint intervals within R, which cannot be. Contradiction has resulted. 0
The following remark, formulated somewhat informally, is straightforward.
Remark A.2. Suppose the extreme outcomes are also included in the domains of Vi, V,. If then V,('%\( minimal outcomes}) is unbounded from below, V, is -co at minimal outcomes. Otherwise V, can be redefined as the i&mum of V,(%?\{ minimal outcomes)) at minimal outcomes without affecting the represented +, and then is continuous. If IQV\{maximal outcomes}) is unbounded from above, then V, is co at maximal outcomes. Otherwise V, can be redefined as the supremum of 1/,(%'\{ maximal outcomes}) at maximal outcomes, and then is continuous. 0
